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other common grounds of exclusion. Specific acts are widely rejected
due to their collateral and misleading nature. 29 This is the usual
basis for excluding them under the aggressor theory. 30 If the courts
are to remain consistent, it would seem that this basis of exclusion
also should be applied to the state-of-mind theory. The fact that
specific acts are being used to show state of mind does not cure their
objectionability, as the acts are still collateral and potentially misleading to the jury.
In addition to the possible confusion specific acts may present
under the state-of-mind theory, there is a greater danger in allowing
them to be shown. This is due to the fact that they are generally admissible under one theory and inadmissible under the other. As a result,
the possibility of the misuse of specific acts is compounded. Not only
may they be collateral as to the issue of the defendant's state of mind,
but also they may be misapplied by the jury to the question of who was
the aggressor. This situation presents a problem, frequently encountered in the law of evidence, as to how the evidence will be handled by
the court. It is generally accepted that evidence admissible under
one theory and inadmissible under another should be admitted with
appropriate instructions to the jury.31 However, the crux of the
problem is whether instructions can cure the inherently objectionable
nature of the evidence. The obvious solution is to give the trial
judge discretion to exclude specific acts when he feels that instructions
cannot cure their potential harm. 32 In any event, the use of specific
acts under either theory is to be viewed with caution and their application re-examined.
CARROLL S. KLINGELHOFER, III

CHILDREN TRESPASSING
ON CHATTELS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
When a child is injured by the personal property of another
located in the public domain, determination of the property owner's
liability has presented a peculiar problem: the child and the property
'1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 192, 193 (3 d ed. 194o).
0Cases cited note 27 supra.
3
'Sprinkle v. Davis, 111 F.2d 925 (4th Cir. 1940); Skinner v. State, 36 Ala. App.
434, 6o So. 2d 363 (1952); People v. Burton, ii Cal. Rptr. 65, 359 P.2d 433 (1961);
State v. Jones, 229 N.C. 276, 49 S.E.2d 463 (1948); 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIENCE § 13
( 3d ed. 1940).
'sSee Adkins v. Brett, 184 Cal. 252, 193 P. 251, 254 (1920).
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owner have an equal right to use the public domain but the child
has committed a technical trespass on the personal property. Traditionally, the duty owed by a property owner to a trespasser has
been to refrain only from wanton, willful, or reckless conduct.1 Consequently, in the absence of such conduct, the technical trespass would
effectively bar recovery by the child. However, as long ago as 1841 in
Lynch v. Nurdin,2 the child was allowed to recover. The court held
that the defendant had failed to exercise ordinary care in foreseeing the
consequences of leaving a tempting and dangerous instrumentality in
the public street. In de-emphasizing the trespass the court said that
the misconduct involved in such a trespass "bears no proportion to
that of the defendant which produced it."'
The recent decision of the Supreme Court of Maine in Cogswell
'Holberg v. Collins, Lavery & Co., 8o N.J. 425, 78 A. 166 (igio); Magar v.
Hammond, 183 N.Y. 387, 76 N.E. 474 (196o); see -Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v.
Priest, 117 Ga. 767, 45 S.E. 35 (1903); O'Brien v. Union Freight R.R., 2o9 Mass. 449,
95 N.E. 861 (1911); Schiffer v. W.N. Sauer, 238 Pa. 55 86 A. 479 (1913).
-l Q.B. 3o, 133 Eng. Rep. 1041 (1841). This case foreshadowed the American
cases which established the turntable or attractive nuisance doctrine, which
essentially is an exception to the general trespass rule. It was first applied to
children trespassing on railroad turntables. The reasoning behind the doctrine
was that the child had been lured onto the land by the instrumentality and the
defendant was responsible for the trespass and therefore could not raise it against
the child. The doctrine gradually was expanded to cover other dangerous instrumentalities. Support was given to the doctrine in 1934 in the Restatement of
Torts. The Restatement dropped the idea of allurement to trespass and treated
the concept as one of ordinary negligence liability. The Restatement was revised
in 1964 and section 339 now provides:
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm to children
trespassing thereon caused by an artificial condition upon the land if
(a) the place where the condition exists is one upon which the possessor
knows or has reason to know that children are likely to trespass, and
(b) the condition is one of which the possessor knows or has reason to
know and which he realizes or should realize will involve an unreasonable
risk of death or serious bodily harm to such children, and
(c) the children because of their youth do not discover the condition
or realize the risk involved in intermeddling with it or in coming within
the area made dangerous by it, and
(d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition and the
burden of eliminating the danger are slight as compared with the risk to
children involved, and
(e) the possessor fails to exercise reasonable care to eliminate the
danger or otherwise to protect the children.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRis § 339 (1964). Thus a defendant is to be held liable
only for negligence, that is, failure to exercise ordinary care. This section is followed
by a great majority of the states and purports to deal solely with children trespassing on private land.
3113 Eng. Rep. at io44.
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v. Warren Brothers Road Company4 involved a five-year old girl who
was injured when the rear of a single-axle flatbed trailer came down
across her thighs. The trailer was parked on a street in a residential
area and left unattended. The defendant had not taken the precautions necessary to prevent the trailer from rotating on its axle. Witnesses had seen children playing on the trailer and had observed
them causing it to act as a seesaw.a The trial court finding that the
plaintiff was a trespasser directed a verdict for the defendant, and the
supreme court affirmed. The court refused to apply an ordinary
care standard, holding that the only duty owed to the plaintiff was
to refrain from wanton, willful, or reckless conduct. Recognizing
its earlier refusal to adopt the attractive nuisance doctrine with
respect to children trespassing on private land, the court refused to
apply the doctrine "to trespassers to personal property in public
domain. ' 6 The court found no distinction between the duty owed
to a child injured while trespassing on private land and that owed
to a child injured while trespassing on personal property located in
the public domain.
The dissent in Cogswell criticized the majority's preoccupation with
Maine's rejection of the attractive nuisance doctrine, stating that
the issues should be resolved by application of ordinary principles of
tort law and not on the basis that all trespassing children should be
penalized for their indiscretions. The defendant should have anticipated children playing on the seesaw trailer and foreseen the possibility
of injury.
A majority of courts which have considered this problem have
allowed the injured child to recover.7 In order to reach this result
courts must somehow avoid the wanton-willful-reckless standard of
conduct applied when a trespasser is involved, in favor of an ordinary care standard. Where the trespass is on private land the attractive nuisance doctrine has been used to effect the avoidance. When
'229 A.2d 215 (Me. 1967).

'There was no eyewitness to the accident, only to the events preceding the accident.
('229 A.2d at 219.

,E.g., Snare & Triest Co. v. Friedman, 169 F. , ( 3 d Cir. 19o9); Morse v. Douglas,
107 Cal. 196, 290 P. 465 (Ct. App. 193o); Edwards v. Kansas City, 104 Kan. 684, 18o
P. 271 ('919); Westerfield v. Levis, 43 La. Ann. 63, 9 So. 52 (1891); Znidersich v.
Minnesota Util. Co., 155 Minn. 293, 193 N.W. 449 (1923); Rotenberger v. Powers
Fuel, Feed, Transfer & Storage Co., 148 Minn. 209, 181 N.W. 641 (1921); Boylhart
v. Di Marco & Reimann, Inc., 270 N.Y. 217, 2oo N.E. 793 (1936); Busse v. Rogers,
120 Wis. 443, 98 N.W. 219 (i9o4). A few courts, however, have denied recovery

to a trespassing child, using reasoning similar to that of the majority in Cogswell.
Gay v. Essex Elec. St. Ry., 159 Mass. 242, 34 N.E. 258 (1893); Fitzgerald v. Rodgers,
58 App. Div. 298, 68 N.Y.S. 946 (19oz).
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the trespass is on personal property situated in the public domain,
the majority of courts reach the same result, but their rationale is
far from uniform. Thus, in order to avoid the lesser duty owed to
trespassers, a number of courts, which recognize the attractive nuisance
doctrine, have applied the same or a similar doctrine to children
in the public domain.3 Other courts, as the court in Lynch, have
reached this result by merely emphasizing the duty of ordinary care
owed to children in the public domain, thus avoiding the problems
presented by attractive nuisance concepts. 9
Of the courts which apply attractive nuisance or a similar doctrine, many apply it to both the public and private land situations. 10
Some of these apply it equally to both," while others imply that
it is more applicable in the public land situation.' 2 The latter courts
recognize the propensity of children to play in the street and point
out that there are many objects which would be attractive and dangerous to children when situated on a highway but would be looked
upon as entirely innocuous if located on private land.' 3 Using this
rationale courts have employed attractive nuisance concepts to arrive
at an ordinary care standard. In Kelly v. Southern Wisconsin Railway
Company14 a child was injured while playing with a pulley which
was lawfully in the street. The court said that neither the fact that
the child was using the street as a playground nor the fact that the
8E.g., Snare & Triest Co. v. Friedman, 169 F. i (3 d Cir. 19o9); Morse v. Douglas,

107 Cal. 196, 290 P. 465 (Ct. App. 193o); Znidersich v. Minnesota Util. CO., 155
Minn. 293, 193 N.W. 449 (1923).
OE.g., Edwards v. Kansas City, 1o4 Kan. 684, 18o P. 271 (1919); Rotenberger v.

Powers Fuel, Feed, Transfer & Storage Co., 148 Minn.
Busse v. Rogers,

120

Wis. 443, 98 N.W.

219

209,

181 N.W. 641

(1921);

(1904).

"°E.g., Cahill v. E.B.A.L. Stone Co., 153 Cal. 571, 96 P. 84 (19o8); Brownell
v. Village of Antioch, 215 Ill. App. 404 (1919); Shapiro v. City of Chicago, 3o8
III. App. 613, 32 N.E.2d 338 (1941); Znidersich v. Minnesota Util. GO., 155 Minn.
293, 193 N.W. 449 (1923); Rognow v. City of Zanesville, 24 Ohio App. 536, 157
N.E. 299 (1926); Kelly v. Southern Wis. Ry., 152 Wis. 328, 14o N.W. 6o (1913). Courts
often do not state specifically that they are applying the attractive nuisance
doctrine but base their decisions on the principles embodied in the doctrine. See
Hurd v. Phoenix Co., 7 Boyce 332, io6 A. 286 (Del. 1918); Jackson v. Texas Co., 143
La. 21, 78 So. 137 (1918); Westerfield v. Levis, 43 La. Ann. 63, 9 Sp. 52 (1891);
Harris v. Eastern Wis. Ry. 9-Light Co., 152 Wis. 627, 14o N.W. 288 (1913).
"E.g., Snare & Triest Co. v. Friedman, 169 F. i (3d Cir. 19o9); Morse v. Douglas,
107 Cal. 196, 290 P. 465 (Ct. App. 1930); O'Bier v. Manufacturers Cas. CO., 70 So.
2d 220 (La. App. 1954).
"E.g., Flis v. City of Chicago, 247 I1. App. 128 (1927); O'Leary v. Michigan
State Tel. Co., 146 Mich. 243, 1o9 N.W. 434 (19o6); Doyle v. City of Chattanooga,
128 Tenn. 433, 161 S.W. 997 (1913); see Spengler v. Williams, 67 Miss. 1, 6 So.
613 (1889).
23Holmberg v. City of Chicago, 244 Ill. App. 55 (1927).
"'152 Wis. 328, 14o N.W. 60 (1913).
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child was a trespasser in meddling with the instrumentality absolved
the owner from his duty of ordinary care. In Snare & Triest Company v. Friedman15 a child was injured when she sat on girders located partially on the sidewalk. The court stated that the doctrine relating to dangerous and attractive structures maintained on a defendant's land is necessarily applicable to cases where the dangerous
attraction is maintained on a public street or highway. 16 Whoever
does anything in or immediately adjacent to a public street which
could foreseeably attract children of the vicinity into danger owes
17
a duty of protection to them.
Two jurisdictions which purport to reject the attractive nuisance
doctrine with regard to private land apply it when the trespass occurs
on an instrumentality located in a public street or sidewalk.'8 Although
New York purports to disclaim the doctrine, "the doctrine, when applied, is applied almost exclusively to dangerous attractions in the
highway; the same attraction off the highway does not impose liabili2
ty." 9 In Tierney v. New York Dugan Brothers, Incorporated, 0
where defendant had failed to lock the doors of his parked truck, the
court said that a dangerous attraction in a public highway may impose liability on one responsible because of failure to exercise due
care, although there would be no liability if the attraction were upon
private premises where a child had no right to go.
Many courts apply a standard of ordinary care initially and
avoid the problems raised in applying the attractive nuisance doctrine to public land situations. 21 Behind these decisions seems to
F. i (3 d Cir. igo9).
161d. at io.
"Smith v. City of Baton Rouge, 166 La. 472, 117 So. 559 (1928).
'See Boylhart v. Di Marco & Reimann, Inc., 270 N.Y. 217, 200 N.E. 793 (1936);
Keenan v. Lawyers Mortgage Co., 254 App. Div. 348, 5 N.Y.S.2d 18 (1938); Rine
v. Morris, 99 W. Va. 52, 127 S.E. 908 (1925).
19Eason v. State, 2o Misc. 336, io4 N.Y.S.2d 683, 687 (Ct. Cl. 1951). A child was
injured when he rode his bicycle into a pile of smoldering leaves. The court,
however, refused to impose liability as the pile was some distance off the highway.
1288 N.Y. 16, 41 N.E.2d 161 (1942).
"Rotenberger v. Powers Fuel, Feed, Transfer & Storage Co., 148 Minn. 2o9,
181 N.W. 641 (1921); Rachmel v. Clark, 205 Pa. 314, 54 A. 1027 (1903); Kressine
v. Janesville Traction Co., 175 Wis. 192, 184 N.W. 777 (1921) (although defendant
is required to exercise ordinary care, he is not an insurer of the safety of
children); Secard v. Rhinelander Lighting Co., 147 Wis. 614, 133 N.W. 45 (1911);
see Valley Planing Mill Co. v. McDaniel, 119 Ark. 139, 170 S.W. 994 (1914);
Edwards v. Kansas City, 1o4 Kan. 684, 18o P. 271 (1919); Harper v. Kopp, 24 Ky.
L. Rptr. 2342, 73 S.W. 1127 (Ct. App. 1903); Lynchburg Tel. Co. v. Bokker, 103
Va. 594, 50 S.E. 148 (19o5); Busse v. Rogers, 120 Wis. 443, 98 N.W. 219 (1904);
cf. Kessler v. Berger, 205 Pa. 289, 54 A. 887 (1903); Coffey v. Oscar Mayer & Co.,
252 Wis. 473, 32 N.W.2d 235 (1948).
'169
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be a recognition that children have a right to be on the highway and
will play there if the opportunity arises. 22 Although it is not correct
to say that streets are playgrounds for children, it would be equally
incorrect to say that one can totally disregard the fact that children
always have and probably always will play there. A child might
realize that he should not go onto another man's private property,
but the same child might feel completely unrestrained playing upon
property located on a public street or sidewalk.
In Campbell v. Model Steam Laundry23 a child jumped onto
the defendant's parked truck and was killed when he subsequently
set the truck in motion. The court said that one is held responsible
for all the consequences of his acts which ought to have been foreseen by a reasonably prudent man. If the defendant fails to exercise
ordinary care, then he is liable for any injury resulting from his
negligence. In Ashbach v. Iowa Telegraph Company24 a child was
injured while playing with the defendant's machinery in the street.
As neither had exclusive right to use of the street, it was the duty of
each to exercise ordinary care. Although the court recognized the
possible application of attractive nuisance concepts, it viewed the
case as much stronger than an attractive nuisance case, since the
machinery was not on the defendant's private premises but on the
street where the child had an equal right to be. The plaintiff does
not have the burden of proving willful or wanton conduct but is
required only to show a lack of ordinary care.2 5
Although they approach the problem differently most courts do
find liability. In the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 339 the general
treatment of trespassing children is based on a standard of ordinary
care. Since the language refers only to possessors of land, the Restatement is not expressly applicable where a child is trespassing on private
property located in the public domain. Nevertheless, it appears that
the majority of jurisdictions apply it anyway. Dean Prosser, Reporter
for the Restatement (Second) of Torts suggested making section 339
When a child is injured on another's property in the street, some courts do
not consider the child a trespasser. See Kelley v. Parker-Washington Co., 1o7 Mo.
App. 490, 81 S.W. 631 (Ct. App. 19o4); Harkins v. East N.Y. Say. Bank, 260 App.
Div. 394, 22 N.Y.S.2d 9o5 (194o); Pate v. Parker, i8o Ore. 33o, 177 P.2d 25o (1947).
In Harkins, a child was injured while playing on the defendant's fire escape which
had inadvertently become lowered and was resting on the sidewalk. The court
held that the child could not be regarded as a trespasser since the fire escape was
on the sidewalk where children had a right to play.
Zs9o N.C. 649, 13o S.E. 638 (1925).
24165 Iowa 473, 146 N.W. 441 (1914).
'De Francisco v. La Face, 128 Pa. Super. 538, 194 A. 511 (1937).

